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Abstract 
 
Studies investigating the relation between managerial ownership and hedge fund survivorship 
risk find mixed evidence because these studies fail to control for potential endogeneity of 
management commitment decision. We document that decisions on management ownership 
are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive 
mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. By accounting for unobserved fund manager 
motivations that affect both ownership decisions, we find no association between the mortality 
risk of hedge funds and managerial ownership, which suggests that the conventional argument 
that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests 
between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using 
alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.  
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1. Introduction 
Hedge funds have accumulated a significant market share among qualified individual and 
institutional investors despite difficult conditions. Nevertheless, Brown et al. (1999), Fung and 
Hsieh (2000), and Getmansky et al. (2004a) have shown that the hedge fund industry is 
characterized by a high attrition rate. Short operating lifetimes and the collapse of many high 
profile funds, such as Long-term Capital Management (LTCM), Peloton Capital, and Tiger 
Management Corp. (Tiger Fund), have attracted the attention of regulators, investors and 
academics to survivorship risk in the hedge fund industry. The impact of hedge fund failures 
on financial stability and how to align IXQGPDQDJHUV¶ LQWHUHVWVZLWK LQYHVWRUVKDYH caused 
significant policy concerns (Brown et al. 2001; Liang and Park 2010). One concern is 
governance on the part of hedge fund managers, who are responsible for investment decisions 
and operations. The US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has moved toward 
regulating hedge funds since 2004, and took a further step under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to 
pursue enforcement actions on governance issues such as remuneration, incentive alignment 
and public disclosure of investment strategies. In Europe, regulatory changes have also centred 
RQWKH(8¶VAlternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). At the same time, the 
financial press suggests that fund managers should taste their own cooking and criticise the 
ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW DVVet managers including BlackRock with the lowest levels of portfolio 
manager investment in their funds and the second largest Vanguard with no managerial 
investment. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate and shed light on empirical links 
between managerial ownership and hedge fund survivorship risk. In addition, since 
institutional investors wish to invest in hedge funds on a long-term basis (Casey, Quirk, Acito 
and the Bank of New York, 2004),  it is also interesting to conduct this survival analysis. 
Hedge fund managers display distinctive features that separate them from mutual fund 
managers and traditional corporate executives. Hedge fund managers focus on absolute returns 
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and often employ complex financial instruments, intricate trading strategies, and high leverage. 
Hedge funds also have an unique organizational structure. Compared with managers of public 
companies, hedge fund managers have near complete control over the structure and operation 
with fewer methods of discipline, such as stringent board oversight. This may allow fund 
managers to impose significant agency costs on investors in the form of fraud, performance 
manipulation, and misaligned compensation incentives (Shadab, 2013, p.149). Ways to 
potentially DOLJQ PDQDJHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV ZLWK WKRVH RI fund investors include incentive-based 
contracts, managerial ownership, dismissal of underperformers, replacement of the 
management team, and government regulation (Gervais et al., 2005).  
In the corporate finance literature, management ownership is one of the mechanisms by 
which shareholder-compatible incentives are created in order to mitigate the agency problem. 
In terms of the broader literature on corporate governance relating to ownership structure, 
Gillan (2006) provides a review on wide range of related issues. The form of managerial 
ownership4 considered in this study is an alternative mechanism to align incentives for value 
maximization in a manner that is not the result of the contract between hedge fund managers 
and fund investors. The hedge fund industry differs radically from traditional corporations in 
that managers charge fees which account for the bulk of their income, as opposed to ownership-
related awards. A distinctive feature of hedge funds is that managers typically levy an incentive 
fee of 5-25% of fund profits on top of an administrative fee based on assets under management 
(AUM), typically about 2%, the so-FDOOHG ³WZR DQG WZHQW\´ VWUXFWXUH. Incentive fees may 
include a high-water-mark (HWM) provision, in which incentive fees can be collected only 
ZKHQUHWXUQVH[FHHGWKHIXQG¶VSUHvious high. How do managerial stakes in their funds come 
about? 
                                                          
4 We use the terms management participation, managerial ownership, and personal capital interchangeably in this 
paper. 
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The link between managerial ownership and hedge fund survivorship risk has not been 
extensively addressed in the literature, and the results of empirical research in support of hedge 
IXQGPDQDJHUV¶RZQHUVKLSare mixed. Baquero et al. (2005) and Aragon and Nanda (2011) 
suggest that the probability of  survivorship risk for funds with high water mark is negatively 
associated ZLWKIXQGPDQDJHUV¶Sersonal capital invested. In terms of the literature on aligning 
the interests of the fund manager with those of investors, Agarwal et al. (2009) develop various 
managerial incentive measures and find managerial ownership is positively associated with 
higher future returns. Lan et al. (2013) demonstrate that managerial ownership can affect hedge 
IXQGPDQDJHUV¶ULVNWDNLQJEHKDYLRULQWKDWKLJKHURZQHUVKLSOHDGLQJWRKLJKHUOLTXLGDWLRQULVN
Boyson (2010),  Liang and Park (2010), and Cumming et al. (2015) show that personal capital 
has no statistically significant impact on fund survivorship. 
While these papers advance our understanding of the effects of managerial ownership, a 
limitation of existing empirical studies is that they implicitly assume managerial ownership is 
an exogenous (i.e., random) decision. This assumption calls into question the inferences 
derived from these research. Unlike the traditional corporate governance incentive mechanism, 
however, managerial ownership in the hedge fund industry is not the result of ex post 
performance rewards, but rather an ex ante self-selected decision. Hedge fund managers can 
choose to invest their personal capital in their own funds in order to raise capital and anticipate 
receiving both asymmetric performance-based direct incentive as well as even higher indirect 
incentive fees. Lim et al. (2016) suggest the existence of indirect incentives which are 1.4 times 
ODUJHUWKDQGLUHFW LQFHQWLYHV IURPLQFHQWLYHIHHVDQGPDQDJHUV¶SHUVRQDOVWDNHV in the fund. 
How do managerial stakes in their funds come about? 
First, fund managers can also use their personal investment as a signal to attract fund 
inflows and discourage redemptions in order to mechanically increase management fees with 
few economies of scale. The literature on signaling through retention starts with the seminal 
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work by Leland and Pyle (1977). The idea in their paper has been extended in several related 
contexts. In money management, Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Huberman and Kandel (1993) 
show that fund managers pick riskier investment strategies in order to signal their ability to 
gather information that enables them to control and profit from this risk; Das and Sundaram 
(2002) study the joint role of performance-based compensation as an incentive and a signaling 
device. It is generally accepted that skill and performance are associated with managers¶
choices of retention, compensation, and risk. In the hedge-fund industry, it has often been 
acknowledged that managers may try to signal their ability by investing their own money in 
the fund they manage. But sending a costly signal may be profitable only if investors are willing 
to pay more for the service of the high quality managers. However, if the signal is not too costly 
for the low ability manager to imitate, the signal may not be informative and then investors can 
not differentiate their choices on the basis of the signal. Such difficulty in providing a credible 
signal of quality in the financial market is emphasized by Vanasco (2014) who assumes that, 
in markets for asset backed securities, investors are unable to fully screen the quality of the 
different assets (a no-transparency assumption). These observations are in line with the 
WKHRUHWLFDO DQDO\VLVGRFXPHQWHGE\)RVWHU DQG<RXQJ  LQ ZKLFK ³PDQDJHUV ZLWKQR
superior information or skill can capture a portion of the fees intended to reward those 
managers who do have such information and skill. In effect, managers who have no ability can 
ride on the coat-WDLOVRIPDQDJHUVZKRGR´$VVXFKDWHQWDWLYHK\SRWKHVLVZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH
that a management participation decision itself may be non-informative for investors. In this 
case the co-investment decision is made regardless of the expected future performance of the 
fund when managers can earn 2% on hedge fund AUM with certainty, dependent solely on 
AUM size, which in turn is likely to be backstopped by redemption limits. On average, 
management fees account for a significant share of industry-wide manager compensation than 
SHUIRUPDQFHIHHV6KDGDES,QDUHFHQWVWXG\/LPHWDOHVWLPDWHWKDW³RQ
6 
 
average managers receive 16 cents in direct pay and at least 23 cents in indirect pay for each 
incremental dollar earned for fund investors. ... and indirect incentives are even larger for 
\RXQJ IXQGV S´7KLV ILQGLQJ VKRZV WKDWKHGJH IXQGPDQDJHUVFRXOGEHPRWLYDWHG WR
have skin in the game not by interest alignment but by higher expected future fee income. A 
modest co-investment could pay off handsomely for managers if it causes AUM to grow 
significantly larger than without co-investment, regardless of hedge fund performance, 
indicating that the cost of a co-investment signal can be low for poor quality managers to 
imitate. As a result, high management fees become a big profit centre (Yin 2016) which distorts 
fund manager incentives. Fee-based incentive misalignment in the hedge fund industry is well 
documeQWHGIRUH[DPSOH³]RPELHIXQGV´VXFKDVthe infamous collapse of Amaranth whose 
manager Brian Hunter lost $7 billion for Amaranth, but still collected more than $100 million 
in compensation after its demise. Later he became an adviser to a different hedge fund, Peak 
Ridge Capital.5 Ozik and Sadka (2015) show that fund managers with skin in the game tend to 
profit from inside information about fund flows and they have the incentive to withdraw 
personal capital stakes precede investors. In these circumstances, if hedge fund managers 
purposely self-select to participate and unobserved factors are not controlled simply by treating 
personal capital as an exogenous covariate as in prior literature, the effect of personal capital 
on survival risk cannot be interpreted.   
Second, in general there is no requirement that fund managers must have their personal 
wealth invested in the funds they manage. Co-investment decisions can be motivated by the 
prospect of financial gain. The common view is that the fund manager may be better informed 
than fund investors regarding fund performance, and therefore has an incentive to participate 
                                                          
5 Celarier SUHVHQWVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHLQKHUDUWLFOHVWDWLQJ³2QHKHGge fund honcho whose multibillion-dollar fund 
shut down in 2008 says that he got the biggest payday of his career that year, thanks to the management fees 
FROOHFWHG EHIRUH WKH IXQG¶V GHPLVH´ Survival of the Fattest. Institutional Investor (March 29, 2012). 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3001820/Research/4368/Overview.html#.V6hYsqI5TN4 
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in excess gains on fund returns. But equity-based rewards and equity options are usually the 
ownership result of ex post performance.6 In contrast, the co-investment decision by hedge 
fund managers tends to be ex ante and motivated for marketing purposes.  Hedge fund 
managers may also be motivated to use a co-investment decision for tax purposes in which they 
structure the ownership of their funds in conjunction with retirement vehicles to tax-shelter 
capital appreciation.   
A possible justification for hedge fund managers not to invest in their own fund is 
diversification.  Hedge fund managers are presumed to be normally risk-averse when it comes 
to their total net worth.  Their risk preference may differ widely from institutional investor 
clients.  The latter are typically tax-exempt and long-term in their investment 
horizon.  Individuals tend to be fully taxed and have far shorter investment horizons.  These 
differences, along with a desire for capital protection, may cause hedge fund managers to limit 
the amount of their net worth invested in their funds.    
As such, hedge fund managers can self-select, making capital contribution decisions based 
on unobservable personal motivations and financial gain calculations, causing the participation 
decision not to be random, but rather purposely and endogenously chosen. If unobservable 
attributes affect both the management participation decision process and the fund survivorship 
process, then simply regressing fund survivorship on a management participation variable may 
not accurately capture the impact of management participation on hedge fund survivorship risk 
unless unobserved attributes are incorporated in the model. 
                                                          
6  We acknowledge that it is difficult for hedge funds to raise capital from institutional investors during the 
incubation period, forcing managers to use internal capital to generate a track record. This shows that such a co-
investment decision is not for aligning interests between fund managers and investors but because of the difficulty 
of raising capital. Some hedge funds have compulsory co-investment requirements for their managers. Those 
managers may instead regard such investments as being a cost of employment.  
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The view that managerial ownership7 aligns the incentives of management and investors 
pervades the general corporate governance literature, and this carries over to the asset 
management industry (see, for example, Khorana et al. 2007). Investors tend to have 
confidence in fund managers with skin in the game and this has become a guiding principle for 
LQYHVWRUV¶LQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQV However, the link between managerial ownership and hedge 
fund survivorship risk has not been extensively addressed in the literature, and the results of 
empirical research LQVXSSRUWRIKHGJHIXQGPDQDJHUV¶RZQHUVKLSare mixed. Baquero et al. 
(2005) and Aragon and Nanda (2011) suggest that the probability of  survivorship risk for funds 
with high water mark is negatively associated ZLWKIXQGPDQDJHUV¶SHUVRQDOFDSLWDOLQYHVWHG
In terms of the literature on aligning the interests of the fund manager with those of investors, 
Agarwal et al. (2009) develop various managerial incentive measures and find managerial 
ownership is positively associated with higher future returns. Lan et al. (2013) demonstrate that 
PDQDJHULDO RZQHUVKLS FDQ DIIHFW KHGJH IXQG PDQDJHUV¶ ULVN WDNLQJ EHKDYLRU LQ WKDW KLJKHU
ownership leading to higher liquidation risk. Boyson (2010),  Liang and Park (2010), and 
Cumming et al. (2015) show that personal capital has no statistically significant impact on fund 
survivorship. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the research design 
and models employed. reviews the related literature and develops the endogeneity arguments. 
Section 3 discusses the research design and models employed. The description of our data on 
hedge fund characteristics is presented in section3 4. The empirical results are presented in 
section 54. Section 65 concludes. 
 
2.2. Self-selection of management participation and fund survivorship 
The standard model of management participation includes a fund manager whose motivation 
and ability are private information. The principal-agent model may be used to describe the 
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willingness of a manager (agent) to signal his/her ability to the investors (principal) by sending 
We conduct a Monte Carlo numerical experiment to investigate the impact of ignoring the 
potential endogeneity of management participation on survivorship risk. The data generating 
process for the simulation experiment allows us to show how biased the estimator is when one 
fits a model to data that are truly generated by the existence of endogeneity. In essence, the 
managerial participation decision is designed to be endogenous but has no statistical 
relationship with the fund survivorship risk process. This design can enable us to assess the 
importance of incorporating endogeneity for management participation decisions, an issue that 
has not yet been explored. The experimental setting and numerical results are presented in 
Appendix A. The simulation results show that the simulated estimator bias increases in absolute 
value as the correlation between management participation and survival processes increases, 
suggesting the causal effect of management participation decision on survival risk cannot be 
interpreted. The bias disappears as the correlation approaches zero. Also, the simulation results 
show that increasing the number of observations cannot make the bias disappear. Therefore, 
the potential endogenous choice of the managerial ownership decision for hedge funds needs 
to be accounted for. We propose a method for doing so in the following sub-section. 
Empirical corporate finance research has shown that managerial ownership reduces agency 
conflicts between investors and corporate managers. The conventional wisdom that co-
investment aligns the interests of hedge fund managers and their investors has developed from 
the standard corporate governance model in which managerial ownership takes the form of 
equities purchases by managers, equity-based compensation and/or equity option awards as 
incentives for better corporate performance. In the stylized model developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the prediction is that the level of managerial ownership is negatively 
associated with agency costs. Although later research suggests that the relationship between 
the extent of managerial ownership and agency costs is non-monotonic (McConnell and 
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Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988), it is generally recognized that managerial ownership can 
In the corporate finance literature, management ownership is one of the mechanisms by 
which shareholder-compatible incentives are created in order to mitigate the agency problem. 
In terms of the broader literature on corporate governance relating to ownership structure, 
Gillan (2006) provides a review on wide range of related issues. The form of managerial 
ownership considered in this study is an alternative mechanism to align incentives for value 
maximization in a manner that is not the result of the contract between hedge fund managers 
and fund investors. The hedge fund industry differs radically from traditional corporations in 
that managers charge fees which account for the bulk of their income, as opposed to ownership-
related awards. A distinctive feature of hedge funds is that managers typically levy an incentive 
fee of 5-25% of fund profits on top of an administrative fee based on assets under management 
(AUM), typically about 2%, the so-called ³two and twenty´ structure. Incentive fees may 
include a high-water-mark (HWM) provision, in which incentive fees can be collected only 
when returns exceed WKHIXQG¶VSUHYLRXVKLJKHow do managerial stakes in their funds come 
about? 
First, hedge fund managers may also use their personal investment as a signal to attract 
fund inflows and discourage redemptions. In this case the co-investment decision is made 
regardless of the expected future performance of the fund when managers can earn 2% on 
hedge fund AUM with certainty, dependent solely on AUM size, which in turn is likely to be 
backstopped by redemption limits. On average, management fees account for a significant 
share of industry-wide manager compensation than performance fees (Shadab, 2013, p.169). 
,QDUHFHQWVWXG\/LPHWDO HVWLPDWHWKDW³RQDYHUDJHPDQDJHUV UHFHLYHFHQWV LQ
direct pay and at least 23 cents in indirect pay for each incremental dollar earned for fund 
LQYHVWRUV  DQG LQGLUHFW LQFHQWLYHV DUH HYHQ ODUJHU IRU \RXQJ IXQGV S´ 7KLV ILQGLQJ
shows that hedge fund managers could be motivated to have skin in the game not by interest 
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alignment but by higher expected future fee income. A modest co-investment could pay off 
handsomely for managers if it causes AUM to grow significantly larger than without co-
investment, regardless of hedge fund performance, indicating that the cost of a co-investment 
signal can be low for poor quality managers to imitate. As a result, high management fees 
become a big profit centre (Yin 2016) which distorts fund manager incentives. 
Second, in general there is no requirement that fund managers must have their personal 
wealth invested in the funds they manage. Co-investment decisions can be motivated by the 
prospect of financial gain. The common view is that the fund manager may be better informed 
than fund investors regarding fund performance, and therefore has an incentive to participate 
in excess gains on fund returns. But equity-based rewards and equity options are usually the 
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ownership result of ex post performance.9 In contrast, the co-investment decision by hedge 
fund managers tends to be ex ante and motivated for marketing purposes.  Hedge fund 
managers may also be motivated to use a co-investment decision for tax purposes in which they 
structure the ownership of their funds in conjunction with retirement vehicles to tax-shelter 
capital appreciation.   
A possible justification for hedge fund managers not to invest in their own fund is 
diversification.  Hedge fund managers are presumed to be normally risk-averse when it comes 
to their total net worth.  Their risk preference may differ widely from institutional investor 
clients.  The latter are typically tax-exempt and long-term in their investment 
horizon.  Individuals tend to be fully taxed and have far shorter investment horizons.  These 
differences, along with a desire for capital protection, may cause hedge fund managers to limit 
the amount of their net worth invested in their funds.    
As such, hedge fund managers can self-select, making capital contribution decisions based 
on unobservable personal motivations and financial gain calculations, causing the participation 
decision not to be random, but rather purposely and endogenously chosen. If unobservable 
attributes affect both the management participation decision process and the fund survivorship 
process, then simply regressing fund survivorship on a management participation variable may 
not accurately capture the impact of management participation on hedge fund survivorship risk 
unless unobserved attributes are incorporated in the model. We conduct a Monte Carlo 
numerical experiment to investigate the impact of ignoring the potential endogeneity of 
management participation on survivorship risk. The data generating process for the simulation 
experiment allows us to show how biased the estimator is when one fits a model to data that 
are truly generated by the existence of endogeneity. In essence, the managerial participation 
decision is designed to be endogenous but has no statistical relationship with the fund 
survivorship risk process. This design can enable us to assess the importance of incorporating 
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endogeneity for management participation decisions, an issue that has not yet been explored. 
The experimental setting and numerical results are presented in Appendix A. The simulation 
results show that the simulated estimator bias increases in absolute value as the correlation 
between management participation and survival processes increases, suggesting the causal 
effect of management participation decision on survival risk cannot be interpreted. The bias 
disappears as the correlation approaches zero. Also, the simulation results show that increasing 
the number of observations cannot make the bias disappear. Therefore, the potential 
endogenous choice of the managerial ownership decision for hedge funds needs to be 
accounted for. We propose a method for doing so in the following sub-section. 
2.23. The multi-process Probit-hazard model 
Heckman¶V (1979) two-stage procedure and instrumental variable estimations are 
commonly used to account for endogeneity. However, +HFNPDQ¶VDSSURDFKFDn only apply to 
a Probit model and linear model relationship. Since the fund survivorship is non-linear (as 
discussed EHORZ+HFNPDQ¶s approach is not applicable. Another approach to modeling the 
endogeneity issue in hedge fund manager ownership is to use instrumental variables for 
managerial ownership; however, it is difficult in practice to identify valid instrumental 
variables (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Coles et al. (2012) suggest that, in the ownership-
performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrument variables do not generally 
provide reliable solutions.10  
                                                          
10 +HFNPDQ¶VWZR-stage procedure involves first estimating a standard formulation of a dichotomous choice model 
to obtain estimates, i.e., a Probit model and then using the estimates from the Probit model to calculate the inverse 
0LOO¶V UDWLR ZKLFK LV LQVHUWHG LQWR WKH VHFRQG VWDJH PRGHO DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH +HFNPDQ¶V WZR -stage 
approach can effectively account for self-selection bias if the second stage model is a linear model. We thank 
William Greene for pointing this out to us. Other two-stage least square estimations are developed to deal with 
potential endogeneity problems in regressors in linear models and some non-linear models. However, to 
"instrument" potential endogenous regressors and correct potential endogeneity problems in survival time, data 
tend to result in inconsistent estimates when predictors from the first stage are used in the second stage regression 
(Terza et al., 2008). Even though Terza et al. (2008) point out consistent estimates can be obtained using the first-
stage estimated residuals, rather than predictors in the second stage non-linear model, the issue of implementing 
such an approach directly on a Probit-multiplicative hazard framework has not yet been resolved. 
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Here we apply a joint estimation approach that explicitly incorporates and models the 
potential endogeneity of management participation ascribed to unobserved attributes which 
affect both managerial ownership decisions and the probability of fund survivorship. Not 
correcting for the potential endogeneity leads to biased estimates, but the joint estimation 
approach can eliminate bias by making the source of the bias part of the model. The latent 
propensity to invest personal capital into the fund, , is the initial managerial ownership 
decision outcome specified as the Probit process: 
                                                                                                                 
(1)  
where  represents the vector of exogenous fund governance, fee structure, and other fund 
attributes;  is the random error term which is assumed to be normally distributed such that 
. The decision outcome, whether or not to invest personal capital, , depends 
on the value of  relative to an implicitly defined zero-threshold: 
 
The conditional likelihood function for the Probit process is given by 
                                                                                    (2) 
where is the cumulative normal density function. 
The survivorship risk of the hedge fund is modeled as a logarithm of a continuous-time hazard 
process given by 
                                                             (3)                                  
where  represents the hazard rate between the probability of default at time t over the 
cumulative probability of fund survival up to time t for fund i.  denotes the baseline hazard 
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fund duration dependence, also known as the piecewise-linear Gompertz spline, which is based 
on the transformation of the spell duration t, with two nodes being used in this study, i.e., 
. We set   to 
capture the effect of the duration on the hazard rate.  represents the vector of time-invariant 
exogenous fund governance and fee structure covariates based on the literature  concerning 
fund performance determinants which shift the baseline hazard.  
The pay-out period is not included as an explanatory variable in the hazard function. The 
pay-out period is the period of time before investors can obtain cash back, during which the 
investor will not receive any return from the investment in the hedge fund. It only appears in 
the managerial co-investment decision process. The pay-out period depends on the settlement 
process, which provides the fund manager with time to prepare for withdrawals.  
Although the pay-out period imposes restrictions on the LQYHVWRU¶V DELOLW\ WR make 
withdrawals of money from the fund, the length of the pay-out period is only a technical factor 
after the net asset value has been determined on redemption. As such, it should have no 
significant impact on the survivorship of hedge funds. Not including the pay-out period 
variable in the hazard estimation ensures that the coefficient of PC, , can be exactly 
identified ± it places an exclusion restriction in which it explains the self-selection decision 
(i.e., management participation) but is unrelated to the failure of hedge funds (i.e., fund 
survivorship).  GHQRWHVWKHIXQGPDQDJHU¶Vpersonal capital, which takes the value of one 
if a participation decision is made and zero otherwise. 
  represents the vector of time-varying fund returns, volatility, and size (AUM) as fund 
returns and size change value during the lifetime of hedge funds. Denote the points in time that 
mark intervals by ሺݐ଴ǡ ݐଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݐ௜ሻ, so that  is constant and equal to ܻሺݐଵሻ between ݐ଴ܽ݊݀ݐଵ , 
jumps to ܻሺݐଶሻ at ݐଵ, remains constant between ݐଵݐଶ, jumps to ܻሺݐଷሻ, et cetara. It is well 
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documented that hedge fund returns exhibit a high degree of serial correlation ± return 
smoothing is one of the sources of such correlation (Getmansky et al. 2004a). Return smoothing 
practices are not uncommon in the hedge fund industry, partly due to trading in illiquid assets 
and partly due to fund managers intentionally misreporting returns (Agarwal et al., 2011; 
Bollen and Pool, 2009; Getmansky et al., 2004a). Return smoothing practices can bias the risk-
adjusted return measures ± for example, an upward bias in the Sharpe Ratio and a downward 
bias in volatility ± causing potentially severe erosion in risk transparency. To address this 
SRWHQWLDOVPRRWKLQJELDVZHDSSO\*HWPDQVN\HWDO¶VDDSSURDFKWRDGMXVWIXQGUHWXUQ
smoothing. This approach is particularly appropriate for our research since the rates of fund 
returns and fund sizes change over time. The choice of a time-varying covariate involves the 
choice of a functional form for the time-dependence of the covariate. Therefore, we calculate 
the mean returns and standard deviation returns for every 12 months based on smoothing-
adjusted returns, which are then used as time-varying explanatory drivers11. By including a 
time-varying AUM variable, it can take advantage of the whole amount of information during 
the lifetime of hedge funds. Time-varying AUM is useful for another reason. In the literature, 
there is a debate about WKHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQIXQGPDQDJHUV¶ULVNWDNLQJDQGIXQGYDOXHwhen 
fund value is below the high-water mark (Lan et al. (2013) and Buraschi et al. (2014)). 
Therefore, using time-varying AUM, volatility and returns during the lifetime of hedge funds 
can SURYLGHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWKHGJHIXQGV¶VXUYLYDOULVN The hazard model with time-varying 
covariates makes data structure with two nested levels, in which the unit level of observation 
is fund level, i.e., level 1 and time-varying covariate is level 2. The term captures 
unobserved heterogeneity at the fund level that affects the hazard rate of survival and is 
assumed to be normally distributed as . Although one might still claim that such 
                                                          
11 Due to the last monthly return and AUM values for some funds being less than -100% and 0, respectively, 
suggesting such funds are defunct, we remove the last month return and AUM values for such funds in order to 
avoid look-ahead bias when estimating the survivorship risk of hedge funds.   
iH
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analysis does not capture the full picture of survival risk, it seems unlikely that the potential 
endogeneity of the co-investment decision issue would vary systematically based on the Monte 
Carlo simulation experiment given in Appendix A. 
Given the log-hazard equation for fund failure, the baseline survival function for each fund 
is given by 
                                                                       (4)
 
where denotes the beginning of the fund. The resulting survival function, conditional on 
exogenous constant covariates , constant covariate , and time-varying covariates ,  
and unobserved heterogeneity component  is 
                                                        (5) 
where the spell is subdivided into I intervals within which time-varying covariates  are 
constant.  The conditional likelihood function for the hazard process is given by 
                                                       (6)   
where  is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if fund I defaults, and zero 
otherwise.  
Managerial ownership can be affected by unmeasured attributes that influence both 
survivorship risk and the decision to risk personal wealth. These unmeasured attributes are 
unobservable to investors, but fund managers themselves might be aware of them. For example, 
a fund manager may have private knowledge that his/her fund is at above-average risk of 
default ± i.e.,  is positive ± so the fund manager may decide not to risk personal capital. The 
observed is correlated with  ± i.e., is endogenous to the fund hazard risk. Failure to 
account for this potential endogeneity will lead to biased estimates (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
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1991). But the unobservable attributes can be eliminated by incorporating the source of the bias 
as part of the model.  
We therefore estimate the two outcomes jointly in order to eliminate bias by assuming that 
the joint distribution of and  has a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance-covariance matrix . 
                                                                                  (7) 
    where denotes the correlation between and , which captures all sources of correlations 
for the two processes.  
The significance of the estimated can be used to test the null hypothesis of exogenous 
investment of personal capital on the survivorship risk of hedge funds. In other words, the 
potential presence of endogeneity of management participation is decided by , which 
captures the influence of unobserved information, such as fund manager motivation and 
capability that can jointly affect management participation decisions and hedge fund 
survivability processes. If the estimated is statistically insignificant, it suggests the fund 
manager¶s personal capital is exogenous to the hazard rate of fund survival, and the estimation 
of Eq.(3) alone does not suffer from endogeneity bias. However, if the coefficient on is 
statistically significant, it suggests that there could be unobserved variables that may 
simultaneously influence the managerial-stake decision and therefore the fund survivorship 
process. It is worth noting that significant correlation does not represent the causal impact of 
management participation on the hazard rate of fund survival, but rather the result of some 
other unknown attributes. 
The joint estimation approach captures the linkages between the survivorship risk of hedge 
IXQGVDQGIXQGPDQDJHUV¶GHFLVLRQto co-invest, which takes into account that the decision of 
managerial ownership is endogenous and provides a measure of the marginal effect of the 
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managerial ownership decision. The joint estimation for the approach of Eq.(1) and Eq.(3) is 
based on maximization of the joint marginal log-likelihood function by integrating the joint 
conditional likelihood functions,  Kpil  and  Hhil , over the heterogeneity components and
. 
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    where  is the bivariate normal density function with variance-covariance matrix . 
The full-information log-likelihood function for the two outcomes combined is maximized 
using the approach of Berndt et al. (1974), as implemented in aML (Lillard and Panis, 2003). 
 
3. Data description 
The hedge fund data used in our analysis are obtained from the Lipper/TASS database for 
the period extending from January 1994 to July 2014. This period is less subject to survivorship 
bias because the TASS database starts reporting information on hedge fund survivorship after 
1994. We eliminate funds that reported in currencies other than the US dollar, leaving a total 
of 11,087 US dollar denominated funds in the dataset. The TASS dataset classifies hedge funds 
into two categories: Live and Graveyard (hereafter Defunct). There are 2,595 Live funds and 
8,492 Defunct funds in our dataset. In order to avoid backfill bias, we remove the first 12 
months return and AUM information for each fund. We also drop those funds that do not report 
AUM, have missing characteristics, or have less than 24 months of reported return observations. 
This results in a final sample of 8,920 US dollar denominated funds, comprised of 1,927 Live 
funds and 6,993 Defunct funds. Our data also contain two types of information related to 
management participation: Personal Capital (PC) and Personal Capital Amount (PCA), where 
PC is a binary variable indicating whether the fund manager has made a personal co-investment 
or not, and PCA shows the actual amount of money hedge fund managers invest alongside that 
K
H
 :|,KHf :
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of investors. There are 810 funds that report a PCA in our final fund sample. With hedge funds, 
manager¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQFRQWUDFWLVVHW at the funds inception and seldom changes during the 
life time of the fund (Agarwal et al. 2009). 
Why do hedge funds disappear? Funds may liquidate or close down due to their poor 
performance, or hedge fund managers may voluntary stop reporting to or dropping out of a database for 
self-selected reasons (Horst and Berbeek, 2007). For example, funds that perform well but do not need 
to attract capital may stop reporting. Lipper/TASS provides a number of reasons for the disappearance 
of funds:  (i) fund liquidations; (ii) funds no longer reporting; (iii) unable to contact; (iv) closed 
to new investment; (v) merged into another fund; (vi) program closed; (vii) unknown. 
Ackermann et al. (1999) argue that those funds no longer reporting their performance or closed 
to new investment should not be classified as defunct because of poor performance, but rather 
because they have no need to attract additional capital. Liang and Park (2010) show that it is 
misleading to infer that disappearance of hedge funds is equivalent to bad performance hedge funds. 
Horst and berbeek (2007) reports that both liquidation and voluntarily drop off from a database are more 
likely for hedge funds that have a poor return history, while the relationship is stronger for  funds being 
liquidated. Lipper/TASS further classifies. Defunct funds into seven sub-categories: (i) fund 
liquidations; (ii) funds no longer reporting; (iii) unable to contact; (iv) closed to new investment; 
(v) merged into another fund; (vi) program closed; (vii) unknown. Ackermann et al. (1999) 
argue that those funds no longer reporting their performance or closed to new investment 
should not be classified as defunct because of poor performance, but rather because they have 
no need to attract additional capital. In later analysis we form the sample by only selecting 
defunct funds in category (i), while the number of Live funds remains the same. We repeat the 
analysis for this hedge fund sample ± denoted as the µAbsolute DHIXQFW¶. There are 5,161 funds 
in the resulting sample, 1,927 Live and 3,234 Defunct.  
 
4. Empirical results 
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4.1. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 presents a descriptive overview of the summary statistics and characteristics for 
both Live and Defunct hedge funds over the research period. Table 1 also presents the 
characteristics of Live and Defunct funds. Personal Capital (PC) is the dummy variable that 
equals one if the fund manager has co-invested in the fund, zero if not. On average, 23% of 
managers have personal capital in their funds, which is lower than that for Defunct funds (27%). 
This suggests that more managers of Defunct funds make personal co-investments than in Live 
funds. Co-investment of fund managers does not seem to have an impact on fund liquidation. 
The size of PCA varies from $1 to $300m. The mean amount of co-investment by fund 
managers is $25.38m and $8.40m for Live and Defunct funds, respectively. Even though on 
average live funds have three times as much invested, it is not necessary to establish that the 
higher the managerial co-investments when measured by dollars invested, the less likely funds 
will fail, as larger proportions of Live funds which have no invested personal capital are still 
live not dead.   
The average (median) duration of Live funds is 8.60 (7.67) years, and the average (median) 
duration of Defunct funds is 5.49 (4.42) years. A Log-rank test for the differences across the 
two groups for the survival duration shows that the differences are significant (p-value = 0.000).  
From Table 1, we find that there is no significant difference in management fees and 
incentive fees between Live and Defunct funds. We also conduct a two-sample t-test to test 
whether investors pay higher management fees to managers who put their skin in the game. 
The test shows that there is no difference (t-value = 0.7084), indicating the signal of managerial 
participation is not informative. This is equilibrium with no separation (i.e., a pooling 
equilibrium), i.e., the signal of managerial ownership is not informative and the equilibrium 
response from investors is not to pay a premium to the hedge funds where managers have skin 
in the game. The percentage of funds that have HWM provisions is slightly higher (67% vs. 
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61%) for Live funds in comparison to Defunct funds. The latter are more likely to use leverage 
(49.29% vs. 57.08%). An examination of cancelation policy variables ± including lock-up 
period and pay-out period ± reveals no significant differences between the Live and Defunct 
funds.  A much higher percentage of the Live funds (16.92%) had a registered independent 
adviser (RIA) compared to the Defunct fund category (8.88%). 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2. Does Managerial Ownership Matter For Fund Survivorship Risk?  
In this section, we examine whether there is a causal impact of managerial ownership on 
the survivorship risk of hedge funds. We jointly estimate the Probit process (examining the 
determinants of managerial stake decisions) and hazard rate process (examining the 
survivorship risk), allowing heterogeneity components to be correlated. Table 2 shows the joint 
estimation results of the multi-process Probit-hazard model that controls for self-selection of 
management participation decisions, in which Panel I displays Probit estimates for managerial 
participation decisions and Panel II displays hazard model estimates. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.1. Test for Endogeneity of the Managerial Ownership Variable  
The first variable of interest in Panel II of Table 2 is correlation . The estimated 
correlation coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level
. This suggests the existence of endogeneity between managerial 
ownership and survivorship of hedge funds, confirming that unobserved attributes influence 
both fund manager co-investment decisions and the survival risk of hedge funds. That is, 
unobserved attributes WKDW SRVLWLYHO\ DIIHFW IXQG PDQDJHUV¶ SURSHQVLW\ IRU PDQDJHPHQW
participation  tend to be negatively associated with unobserved attributes that affect 
survivorship risk . The statistical significance of implies that the impact of 
managerial ownership is biased if endogeneity is not accounted for. The size of the bias depends 
U
U
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on the magnitude of ,  and the severity of the truncation12.  Note that the significance of 
correlation is not caused by fund manager co-investments but by unobserved factors that drive 
both management participation and fund liquidation risk processes. 
This result is consistent with Loderer and Martin (1997) who also use a simultaneous 
equation framework and find that the positive relationship between ownership and performance 
disappears when endogeneity is accounted for. Our estimation result confirms the findings of 
Brown et al. (2008) that regulators should take the endogenous production of information into 
account in evaluating the role of hedge funds; it also confirms those of Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
that a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by 
unobserved firm heterogeneity, and that change in managerial ownership has no impact on firm 
performance.  Finally, this finding is consistent with Palia¶V (2001) argument that managerial 
compensation is endogenously determined and higher management ownership is unrelated to 
firm value. Though the finding unobserved attributes affect both managerial ownership 
decision and liquidation processes is important on its own, another interesting question is what 
the unobserved source of variance could be. We present a test designed to identify and assess 
the impact of unobserved attributes in subsection 4.2.5. 
4.2.2. Test for the Personal Capital Variable  
                                                          
12 The expected hazard rate for fund i given that fund managers make ownership decisions  is: 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where I and ) denote probability density function and cumulative probability function of the standard normal 
distribution, respectively.  
 
The expected hazard rate for fund i given that fund managers do not make ownership decisions  is: 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The difference between the expected hazard rate with and without managerial ownership is:           )]1(/[]0|[ln]1|[ln iiiiiii xcxcxcPCthEPCthE OOOIUVG H ))    
Since both HV and truncation term      )]1(/[ iii xcxcxc OOOI )) are positive, and 0zU , the impact of estimated 
coefficient G  is biased by      )]1(/[ iii xcxcxc OOOIUVH ))  . 
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The coefficient of managerial ownership PC shown in Table 2 is insignificant
, indicating that hedge fund managers investing in the funds they 
manage do not statistically reduce the risk of fund survivorship when taking endogeneity into 
account. This is consistent with the results reported in Boyson (2010) and Liang and Park 
(2010), but contradicts the widespread perception that if investors select funds from those 
managers who have skin in the game, they substantially improve their odds of beating the 
market. Conventional thinking suggests that hedge fund managers invest a significant 
proportion of their assets in a fund as they are profit maximizing and recognize their own 
skill. This over-simplification leads to a misunderstanding about the impact of own 
investments in a fund.  We interpret this apparently contrasting result as being partly due to the 
existence of self-selection bias and inappropriate treatment of management participation 
decisions as exogenous, and partly due to the asymmetric reward structure and the focus on 
absolute returns. Fung and Hsieh (1999) point out that under extreme circumstances fund 
managers have the option to expose their personal wealth to losses by taking excessive risk, 
driven by the adverse gambling incentive embedded in the asymmetric reward structure of their 
compensation contracts. Therefore, managers with skin in the game may well find that the 
incentive to take risks to achieve a performance fee is in excess of what they can achieve 
through capital gains on their investment in their fund. When the performance fee is a 
percentage of the hurdle rate, this can theoretically happen wherever the skin in the game 
percentage is smaller than the incentive percentage.  
The insignificance of managerial ownership on fund survivorship performance conforms 
to a well-developed strand of theories on managerial myopic behavior which shows that 
company managers tend to underinvest in high net present value but long-term projects if 
compensation contracts only consist of short-term (cash) plans. Narayanan (1996) derives three 
testable hypotheses for why companies benefit from the existence of both cash and stock 
)86.0,1535.0(   tPC
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incentive schemes in executive compensation packages, in which long-term stock 
compensation can resolve the problem of myopic investment. The short-term incentive 
mechanism is the basis of hedge fund management; therefore, the impact of managerial 
ownership is dependent on incentive packages. In regular companies, executive managers are 
likely to have incentives to invest for the long-term (i.e., not to generate high short-term income 
at the cost of long-term performance), while hedge fund managers may have incentives to 
maximize short-term profit at the cost of long-term survivorship performance. This is because 
a large proportion of fund PDQDJHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ SDFNDJH LV DVVRFLDted with short-term 
performance (percentage of annual profit).   
The insignificance of PC reported above could raise questions about the data source used 
in this study. Given the key variable PC provided by TASS is only snapshot, could the 
endogenously determined co-investment decision be resolved if time series of co-investment 
decisions were used? In order to address this question, a dynamic Probit/Logit model is needed 
to analyze co-investment decisions such as 1 itPC  if a co-investment decision is made in 
month t as 0* !itPC  and 0 itPC otherwise. As co-investment decisions could be inherently 
persistent and dynamic, initial decision condition 
0iPC is correlated with unobserved factors 
that can affect
itPC . If 0iPC is taken as exogenous, estimators can still be inconsistent even if 
the time series of 
itPC are used instead, which is called the initial conditions problem. Agarwal 
et al. (2009) assume that hedge fund managers can reinvest all of the incentive fees into the 
fund after paying personal taxes; could such reinvestment be a proxy of a time series of 
managerial ownership? While reinvestments of incentives fees offer time variation of co-
investment, the economic or statistical significance differential from hedge fund return risks is 
not clear-cut (for details see Section 4.3).  
Panel I of Table 2 also reports additional coefficient estimations for the multi-process 
Probit-hazard model. We employ the following determinants to explain the managerial stake: 
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management fee, incentive fee, HWM, leverage, lock-up period, pay-out period, RIA, category 
and initial AUM. All variables are significantly related to the managerial stake. Management 
fee is negative and significant, suggesting that with a lower management fee, fund managers 
are more likely to invest their own capital. Management fee is also an asset-based fee that 
provides hedge fund managers with a steady income stream. It can be considered as a 
component of managerial ownership, therefore with a higher management fee, fund managers 
are less likely to invest their own capital. Higher incentive fees encourage managers to 
participate. The hedge fund manager is a wealth maximizer, so should focus on the element 
which is most likely to make him/her the greatest financial gain.  The positive coefficient from 
the incentive fee and the negative from the management fee indicate that the former is more 
important.  
One of the aspects that differentiate hedge funds from other investment vehicles is the use 
of leverage. The estimation result shows a positive link between leverage and manager 
incentives for co-investment. If the manager has skill, or believes he/she or she has skill, it is 
in his/her best interests to maximize that skill through leverage. The manager will not be able 
to do this as effectively, in his/her personal capacity, as in a collective investment vehicle; such 
a vehicle also has the advantages of limited liability. 
Recall that the lock-up period refers to the time during which the invested money cannot 
be withdrawn. The positive impact of the lock-up period on co-investment is because that lock-
up period reduces fund-flow sensitivity, contributing to more stable fund management and 
management freedom in pursuing investment strategies (Baba and Goko, 2009), hence more 
possibilities in investing in illiquid asset classes. Consequently, longer lock-up periods should 
encourage fund managers to invest in their own funds,. Though, like the lock-up period, the 
pay-out period is a technical function of the settlement of redemptions, the pay-out period is 
the period during which investors will not receive any returns on fund performance. Therefore 
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if the fund manager has personal capital invested, as an investor, he/she may dislike a longer 
and high. This may be attributable to more professional hedge fund managers registering 
onshore and being more likely to invest in their own funds. The positive coefficient for the 
  
4.2.4. Test for Other Control Variables 
Also reported in Table 2 are estimations for the hazard process model. We employ several 
variables used in survival analysis that may influence the attrition rates of hedge funds 
suggested in the hedge fund literature on fund characteristics, such as Agarwal et al. (2009), 
Brown et al. (2001), Goetzmann et al. (2003), and Panageas and Westfield (2009).  
These variables can be categorized into four groups: (i) managerial participation ± PC and 
PCA; (ii) governance and fee structure ± management fee, incentive fee, HWM, leverage, and 
RIA; (iii) cancelation policy ± lock-up periods and pay-out periods; and (iv) fund performance 
± fund returns and size. The survivorship risk for the first five years rises sharply
, after which it remains stable between years five and eight 
.  After eight years, however, the survivorship risk again rises slightly
. 
The level of management fees does not have a statistically significant impact on fund 
survivorship. However, the loading for the incentive fees variable is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, implying that high incentive fees increase the hazard rate of fund survivorship
. Contributions to the hedge fund literature on the role of 
without HWM, which confirms the argument that HWM may cause managers to pursue high-
risk investment strategies (Goetzmann et al., 2003).  The leverage has no effect on fund 
survivability because hedge fund leverage is significantly less than that of depository 
institutions and investment banks (Gupta and Liang, 2005) due to the market discipline 
imposed by their creditors and investors.  
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With respect to the lock-up period, our results indicate that a longer lock-up 
 can increase the survivorship-hazard rate of funds., which is 
consistent with Our results lend support to the argument proposed in Baba and Goko (2009) 
that investors dislike less liquidity, so the longer the lock-up period the less likely they are to 
invest, which in turn destabilizes fund management. Agarwal et al. (2009). also provide 
evidence that a longer lock-up period is associated with fund flows, and therefore has a negative 
impact on fund survival. Lastly, there is statistically significant evidence that funds with RIAs 
are less likely to fail than non-RIA funds . Aragon et al. (2013) 
show evidence that some advisers actively avoid registration by changing fund characteristics. 
Therefore, for funds that are registered with SEC, we expect that after qualifying within the 
strict guidelines the firm is capable enough to handle the adviseU¶VLQYHVWPHQWV7KHUHLVQR
significant difference between funds of funds and those funds in other categories
. 
Regarding the impact of time-varying covariates, fund annual returns have a significant 
influence on the risk of fund survivorship in the expected direction. T the statistically 
significant loading of fund annual returns  suggests that a 1% increase 
in annual returns leads to a 3.52% decline in fund failure. The loading of fund annual return 
volatility is positive and significant  ± in line with previous findings that 
higher return and lower volatility tend to have lower liquidation probabilities (see for example 
Baba and Goko, 2009; Baquero et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2001; Liang, 2000). Fund size is 
negatively associated with survivorship risk, indicating that funds with larger and more stable 
assets are less likely to be liquidated .  
 
4.2.5. Decomposing Managerial Stakes 
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In this subsection, we present a test that explicitly investigates what the unobserved 
attributes could be. We apply the approach of Khorana et al. (2007) to decompose the 
managerial ownership decision into observed and unobserved fund attributes. We first estimate 
Eq.(1) by regressing managerial ownership decision on the set of observed fund 
characteristics  to generate observed attributes  and use the estimated residuals as 
unobserved attributes, i.e., , where  denotes the cumulative normal 
distribution. We then estimate the impact of unobserved attributes for management 
participation decision on hedge fund survivorship risk. That is,  
                       (9) 
where 
 
If the coefficient of the unobserved component is significant, it implies that managerial stakes 
contain information that influences the fund survivorship rate but remains unobserved. The 
survivorship risk estimation results are presented in Table 3. 
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
We find that the estimated coefficient on unobserved attributes is negative and statistically 
significant from zero , which implies that the unobserved 
attributes can reduce the likelihood of hedge fund liquidation.  As this result is in line with that 
for the significant negative correlation between management participation and fund liquidation, 
we view that the unobserved attributes can be interpreted as fund managers¶ investment IQ or 
skill.  This interpretation is based on the following argument. Suppose a fund manager with a 
higher IQ is more likely to invest personal stakes; and it is also likely that a fund with a higher 
IQ manager is less likely to fail. Thus if managerial ownership decision can be viewed as a 
signal of a higher IQ, such decisions may be deemed worthy being copied by lower skilled 
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managers. Given that the costs of copycatting with respect to rewards from direct and indirect 
incentives are relatively small, lower skilled fund managers could also be motivated to send 
such a signal to investors, making management participation decisions be incentive 
incompatible and non-informative. &RXOGIXQGPDQDJHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVEHXVHGDVSUR[\IRU
unobserved IQ or skill? Chevalier and Ellison (1990) provide evidence that PDQDJHU¶V6$7
score, MBA degree, age, tenure are somehow associated with fund performance. The fact that 
the explanatory power is very low ሺܴଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ in their paper suggests that such characteristics 
explain little variation in IQ/skill, i.e., insufficiently related to the unobserved investment skill.  
 
4.2.6. Personal Capital Commitment 
In the above subsections we treat managerial participation as a binary decision: the fund 
manager either invests in his/her fund or not. Could the endogenously determined co-
investment decision be resolved if time series of co-investment decisions were used? In the 
context of corporate finance, Leland and Pyle (1977) explain that the information content of a 
PDQDJHU¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVUHODWHGWRhow far KHLVZLOOLQJWR³VWLFNKLVQHFNRXW´7KHUHIRUH
we further investigate whether this is the case for the hedge fund industry. Unlike the mutual 
fund industry, hedge fund managers are not required to report their personal investments under 
SEC regulations, so the available dataset is based on voluntary reporting. Only 10% of hedge 
funds in the Lipper/TASS database have reported a personal capital amount (PCA). 
Consequently prior empirical evaluation of the impact of managerial ownership on the failure 
of hedge funds uses PC as a measure of managerial ownership. A paper by Aragon and Nanda 
(2011) uses PCA to test whether having a personal investment in the fund influences a 
PDQDJHU¶VULVN-taking behavior and finds that risk-shifting is less evident among managers with 
larger investments of PC in the fund. 
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As a robustness test, we replace the PC variable with PCA, which is used to explore the 
LPSDFWRI WKHGHJUHHRI µVNLQ LQ WKHJDPH¶RQDIXQG¶VVXUYLYDO As stated earlier, this is in 
response to a concern that using a binary indicator for PC may not fully capture the effect of 
co-LQYHVWPHQW PHFKDQLVPV RQ D IXQG¶V VXUYLYDO  We jointly estimate Eq.(3) but substitute 
covariates remain the same, i.e.,  with 
linear OLS regression for PCA, i.e., . As in the Probit-hazard model, 
and  are also assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance-covariance matrix . The estimations are presented in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Our results continue to hold for this more restrictive sample. The loading of PCA is not 
statistically significant, indicating that high levels of personal investment in funds do not 
reduce fund liquidation risks. Although this result does not support the traditional view that a 
management stake has a positive association with hedge fund survival, it does not undercut the 
logic. Having limited managerial ownership does not necessarily point to the failure of 
managerial incentive. For example, investors would hardly commit a major share of their 
personal wealth into investments that seem to fail. By the same token, it is possible that 
managers prefer not to invest extensively in funds or strategies they deem likely to fail. The 
estimation results show that the coefficients of most governance, fee structure and cancelation 
policy covariates are comparable, regardless of the measure of managerial stakes. 
 
4.3. Managerial Stakes as an Exogenous Variable: Test using the Single Hazard Model 
The insignificance of PC reported above could raise questions about the data source used 
in this study. Given the key variable PC provided by TASS is only snapshot, could the 
endogenously determined co-investment decision be resolved if time series of co-investment 
decisions were used? In order to address this question, a dynamic Probit/Logit model is needed 
      iiii PCAtYtTth iX HGJWD E  )(lnln *
iii XcPCA KO  ln
H K
:
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that the PC variable is exogenous, as commonly used in the prior literature. Table 5.a reports 
the estimation results of the single hazard rate process without controlling for self-selection 
which is specified in Eq.(3).   
[Insert Table 5.a here] 
We observe that the managerial stake covariate, PC, is statistically significant and negative
 under this specification. This is not surprising, and is consistent 
with the conventional view that survivorship risk is lower for those funds whose managers 
make a personal capital commitment to their funds. But after comparing the results for the 
single process estimation with those of joint estimation, we observe that these findings may 
incorporate an overestimation of the effects of managerial ownership if self-selection bias is 
ignored. With respect to the remaining covariates, we find higher incentive fees; longer lock-
up periods and higher return volatility all significantly raise the probability of liquidation, 
whereas RIA, fund returns and AUM have the opposite effect. There is no significant difference 
between fund of funds and funds in other categories, all of which are consistent with our priors.  
  Agarwal et al. (2009) examine the role of managerial incentives and present evidence 
suggesting that the reinvestment of incentive fees by managers can be a proxy measure for 
managerial ownership DQG ³FUHDWH IHZHU HQGRJHQHLW\ FRQFHUQV WKDQ W\SLFDOO\ DULVH LQ D
FRUSRUDWH ILQDQFH VHWWLQJ´  Assuming that hedge funds with higher level of managerial 
ownership are associated with superior performance, we expect to observe more reductions in 
survival risk for higher level reinvestments. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the single 
process hazard model, replacing PC with a reinvestment time-variant variable, as measured by 
the cumulative value of the incentive fee reinvested together with the returns on it at any point 
in time, assuming that the hurdle rate is the sign of hedge fund returns (i.e., if hedge funds 
return is positive, the manager receives incentive fees and zero otherwise).  
[Insert Table 5.b here] 
  23.4,2234.0   tpcE
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To estimate the impact of time-varying reinvestment on fund survival risk, we use the 
specification similar to the estimation results presented in Table 5.a, with one variable change 
and the estimation results are presented in Table 5b.  The coefficient on reinvestment 
(representing managerial ownership) is statistically significant from zero but, surprisingly, 
positive )0.50  ,7494.1(   townershipE with unusual high t-statistics suggesting the cumulative 
reinvestment variable may be collinear with AUM. Further, inconsistent with the view that 
higher volatility of fund returns is associated with higher survival risk, the coefficient on fund 
return volatility becomes statistically insignificant from zero )39.0  ,0206.0(   tvolatilityE  , while 
both the sign and significance of other time-varying coefficients on returns and size remain the 
same in this specification. We interpret the results as evidence of managerial ownership being 
DSUR[\IRUXQREVHUYHGIXQGPDQDJHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQV7KHIDFWWKDWWKHFRHIILFLHQWRQYRODWLOLWy 
becomes insignificant seems to suggest that the reinvestment incentive fee measure and 
volatility are picking up a common phenomenon (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). In general, it is likely 
that the causal effect of managerial ownership in previous literature could come from not 
FRQWUROOLQJXQREVHUYHGIXQGPDQDJHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQV 
 
4.5. Robustness Test: using the Absolute Defunct Fund Sample 
As noted, the TASS database classifies its Defunct hedge funds into seven sub-categories 
based on their reasons for failure ± liquidation is not the only reason why hedge funds drop out 
of the live fund category (Getmansky et al., 2004b). Some Defunct funds in the Graveyards 
category may choose to exit from the TASS database, not because of poor performance but 
rather having no incentive to report to TASS (Ackermann et al., 1999; Baquero et al., 2005).  
Liang and Park (2010) also point out that it might be misleading to regard all the funds in 
the Graveyard category as failed ones in survival analysis. But, it is generally agreed that those 
funds falling into the liquidation category are fail funds because they tend to suffer from 
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negative returns and high volatility. Therefore, we restrict our analyses to this sub-category, 
namely the Absolute Defunct sample, in order to verify that our estimation results do not suffer 
from different classifications for TASS Graveyard fund sample selectivity issues. We repeat 
our analysis with this restricted sample using the multi-process Probit-hazard model. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
We find that the loading on the PC variable remains insignificant 
in the multi-process Probit-hazard model, demonstrating that 
our previous finding, that managerial ownership has no association with the disappearance of 
hedge funds, is not subject to sample choices.  
The loading on negative values of continues to show a significant negative value
, confirming that there are unobserved variables that 
simultaneously influence the co-investment decision and fund liquidation. None of our 
estimation results appears to be affected by different TASS Graveyard fund samples, 
suggesting that it is unlikely that our results are affected by different defunct fund classification 
problems. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Empirical corporate finance research has shown that managerial ownership reduces agency 
conflicts between investors and corporate managers Investors expect hedge fund managers to 
invest their personal wealth, hoping to align their incentives with the interests of both parties, 
thereby reducing the agency problem. The decision whether to commit personal stakes is 
largely at the discretion of fund managers themselves; as such it may mitigate the expected 
effects of managerial stakes on hedge fund survivorship risk.  We generally cannot observe 
information on why fund managers make co-investment decisions. Such decisions tend to be 
) 32.0,0480.0(   tPCAbsolute
U
)61.2,4327.0(   tU
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intertwined between unobservable fund managers, skill and motivation with fund liquidation, 
which are far from innocuous. When taking the relationship between the survivorship risk of 
hedge funds and managerial ownership decision into account, we find that a IXQGPDQDJHU¶V
decision of having skin in the game fails to predict hedge fund longevity because we cannot 
rule out the possibility that fund managers could be motivated by direct incentive fees as well 
as higher indirect incentives. This would suggest the signal of management participation 
decision tends not to be informative for fund performance. Therefore, management 
participation should not be the sole investment decision for investors. Instead investors should 
focus more on management, incentive structures, and after-fee performance. 
This study complements both theoretical and empirical researches that investigate the 
impact of incentive schemes on the hedge fund industry. Our results may help in understanding 
the apparently contradicting results of previous studies, which fail to consider an endogeneity 
bias. This paper highlights the importance of accounting for endogenous information that has 
been pointed out in Brown et al. (2008). We confirm the roles of fund returns, size, incentive 
fees, HWM and lock-up provisions in predicting hedge fund failure. Performance and size are 
important determinants of fund survivorship, regardless of whether we use a full sample of 
funds or an Absolute Defunct fund sample.  
Our study has several implications. First, the relationship between hedge fund managers 
and investors appears to form a typical agency relationship, which has potentially important 
implications for the application of agency theory to the hedge fund industry. There is a tension 
between obtaining interest alignment EHQHILWVDQGUHVWUDLQLQJ IXQGPDQDJHUV¶ LQFentives for 
excess risk taking in order to attract and increase the size of their fund (Aggarwal and Jorion, 
2010). The commitment of personal capital by fund managers by itself may not be the optimal 
solution to align the incentives of fund managers and fund investors. This is mainly because 
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hedge fund PDQDJHUV¶ compensation structure incorporates the incentive to maximize the 
present value of direct and indirect incentive fee income. 
Second, the findings are relevant both to investors and regulators. After the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, the hedge fund industry faced much greater scrutiny. There have been 
arguments about whether or not disclosure of managerial ownership should be made mandatory 
± see Khorana et al. (2007) for a summary. Our results, however, suggest that ownership 
disclosure is immaterial for investors. Under voluntary disclosure, hedge funds might reveal a 
suboptimal level of information to investors (Coffee, 1984). Based on information asymmetry 
models, Stiglitz (2002) shows that the private provision of information tends to be subject to 
market failure. The results of our study are consistent with the argument that disclosure of 
management stakes provided by hedge funds cannot be taken at face value.   
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Appendix A: Monte Carlo simulation design and setting 
Our emphasis in this simulation experiment is on the bias in the estimator of managerial 
participation on hedge fund survival risk that may arise if potential endogeneity of participation 
is ignored. The management participation decision process employs a latent variable 
specification. The latent variable is given by iii Xy KO  *  where iX is a set of exogenous 
variables,  2,0~ KVK Ni  and the observable management participation variable 1 iy if 
0* !iy  and 0 iy  if 0* diy . The specification of fund survivorship risk process employs a 
parametric Weibull hazard model in that     iii Ztth HGOQ Q   exp1  where  1QOQt  is the 
baseline hazard, iZ is the set of exogenous variables, and  2,0~ HVH Ni  . As explained in 
Section 2, the model requires taking the endogeneity issue for management participation iy
into account. Therefore we allow a correlation structure between iK  and iH to follow a bivariate 
normal distribution with correlation U , capturing the omission of some important factors that 
affect both management participation decision and fund survivorship risk processes. Note we 
do not include iy when simulating survival time for the Weibull hazard model. However, the 
simulated iy will be included in the Weibull hazard estimation process as an explanatory 
variable afterwards.  This allows us to examine the impact of iy on simulated survival risk 
when actually there is no impact at all.  
The parameter choices in the simulation experiment and data generating process are as 
follows. We set the number of observations N = 1000:1000:10000 and the number of 
simulations M = 1000. We draw the random error terms iK  and iH from a bivariate normal 
distribution with 6.0 KV , 0.1 HV , and 9.0:05.0:9.0 U . We then simulate the binary 
management participation decision, iy , from a binomial distribution with probability iS , 
which is given by    iiii Xy KTS ) )  1*1  where  x)1  is the inverse cumulative 
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normal distribution function. The single exogenous regression iX is drawn from a chi-square 
distribution with 6 degrees of freedom and 1 T  . Next, we simulate the survival risk for hedge 
funds. In doing so we need to generate survival time iT and censoring time iL . Note survival 
time and censoring time are independent. Survival time iT follows a Weibull distribution and 
is simulated by 
 
 
Q
HGO
/1
exp
log
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 iii Z
U
T                                                  (A.1) 
where U follows a uniform distribution with > @1,0~ UU  , scale parameter 02.0 O , shape 
parameter 2 Q , the exogenous variable iZ  is drawn from standard normal distribution, and 
1 G . Censoring time iL  is simulated from an exponential distribution  igE  with  ii Tg P . 
Having generated both survival time iT and censoring time iL , we can decide the censoring 
variable iC  such that  iii LTIC d . As a result, the simulated data is a triplet of  iii ZC ,,W  
which is ready for conducting the Weibull hazard model estimation, where  iii LT ,min W .  
Finally, we conduct a hazard model estimation based on the simulated triplet data and iy . Note, 
in this final step we deliberately include iy  as a supposed exogenous explanatory variable, such 
that     iiyi ZYtth HGJOQ Q   exp1 , where the simulated coefficient J can enable us to 
assess the biasness of the estimator with different correlation values of U .  
 Figure 1 presents the estimation results for the simulated data when the true estimated 
value of J  should be zero. The plot shows the simulated estimates of J are biased when 
correlation values of U differ from zero. Stronger correlation between iK  and iH will lead to 
greater bias ofJ . Increasing the sample size cannot eliminate the estimation bias.     
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Table 1 
Cross-sectional hedge fund characteristics. 
 
 Live Funds Graveyard Funds 
Characteristics Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. 
PC  0.2277 0.0000 0.4194 0.2701 0.0000 0.4441 
PCA (M$) 21.3871 5.0000 34.3532 8.5466 2.0000 21.8651 
Management fee  0.0143 0.0150 0.0058 0.0146 0.0150 0.0071 
Incentive fee  0.1453 0.2000 0.0828 0.1565 0.2000 0.0767 
HWM  0.6652 1.0000 0.4120  0.6148  1.0000 0.4866  
Leverage  0.4929 0.0000 0.5000 0.5708 1.0000 0.4950 
Lock-up (month) 3.1588 0.0000 6.7664 3.1278 0.0000 6.7468 
Pay-out (day) 16.896 10.000 24.775 15.686 10.000 20.917 
RIA  0.1692 0.0000 0.3750 0.0888 0.0000 0.2844 
Duration (year) 8.6060 7.6712 5.7451 5.4926 4.4164 4.2220 
 
Note: This table presents the summary of cross-sectional hedge fund characteristics. Personal Capital (PC) 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the fund manager has co-invested in the fund, and zero otherwise. 
Personal Capital Amount (PCA) is a continuous variable measuring the dollar amount of KHGJHPDQDJHUV¶
co-investment. Management fee is proportional (typically between 1-2%) to the total asset. Incentive fee 
is the term in the compensation contract which gives managers a percentage of any positive returns. It is 
reported as a percentage in the database. High-water-mark (HWM) is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the fund has a watermark provision and zero otherwise. Leverage is a dummy variable which equals one if 
the fund employs leverage and zero otherwise. Lock-up period refers to the time during which the invested 
money cannot be withdrawn. Pay-out period is the time period before investors will receive their capital 
back. RIA indicates whether the hedge fund has become registered with investment advisers. Duration is 
defined as the fund¶VWLPHWRIDLOXUH 
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Table 2 
Joint estimation results for multi-process Probit-hazard model using personal capital ± full sample. 
 
 Full Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Panel I: Probit Estimates  
Constant -0.4915*** -3.60 
Management fee -6.4709** -2.50 
Incentive fee 3.3120*** 11.0 
HWM -0.3060*** -6.91 
Leverage 0.4604*** 12.1 
Lock-up period 0.0612*** 4.10 
Pay-out period -0.1912*** -7.48 
RIA 0.7598*** 13.0 
Category 0.1799*** 4.75 
Initial AUM -0.3684*** -4.91 
 
Panel II: Hazard Estimates 
Spline0-5 0.4090*** 13.1 
Spline5-8 0.0000 0.00 
Spline8+ 0.0696*** 6.32 
Constant -0.4203** -2.78 
PC 0.1535 0.86 
Management fee 2.6382 1.00 
Incentive fee 1.5608*** 4.54 
HWM 0.1047** 2.11 
Leverage -0.0526 -1.15 
Lock-up period 0.0590*** 3.26 
RIA -0.4670*** -6.14 
Category -0.0029 -0.06 
Fund return -1.0450*** -26.6 
Volatility 0.7474*** 24.5 
AUM -0.4833*** -15.0 
 
0.4257*** 3.39 
 1.0795
*** 9.77 
 -0.5848*** -3.73 
Log Likelihood -46639.5973 
 
Note: TKLVWDEOHUHSRUWVWKHMRLQWFRHIILFLHQWHVWLPDWHVRID3URELWPRGHOIRUWKHIXQGPDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDO
capital of Equation (1) and a log-continuous hazard model for the hedge fund failure of Equation (3). 
The dependent variable for Equation (1) takes on the value of one if the fund manager invests personal 
capital and zero otherwise. The sample extends from January 1994 to July 2014. The estimation results 
are obtained by full information maximum likelihood estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * 
are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3 
Effects of observed and unobserved managerial ownership attributes on fund survivorship risk ± full 
sample. 
 
 Full Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Hazard Process 
Spline0-5 0.3343*** 17.7 
Spline5-8 -0.0498 -2.52 
Spline8+ 0.0561*** 6.76 
Constant -0.5683*** -5.28 
 -0.1777*** -5.36 
Management fee -0.2262 -0.11 
Incentive fee 1.7292*** 7.43 
HWM 0.0970 2.73 
Leverage -0.0038 -0.12 
Lock-up period 0.0515** 3.55 
RIA -0.3547*** -6.74 
Category -0.0093 -0.26 
Fund return -1.4197*** -33.4 
Volatility 0.3966*** 14.1 
AUM -0.4082*** -19.4 
 0.7119
*** 9.41 
Log Likelihood  -41646.1273 
Note: This table reports the effects of observed and unobserved managerial ownership attributes on 
hedge fund failure. Both observed and unobserved attributes are generated by estimating the Probit 
model as shown below. The sample extends from January 1994 to July 2014. The estimation results are 
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
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Table 4  
Joint estimation results for multi-process OLS-hazard model using personal capital amount ± full 
sample. 
 
 Full Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Linear OLS Process  
Constant 6.6212*** 19.7 
Management fee 0.2417*** 3.16 
Incentive fee -0.0034 -0.35 
HWM 0.0710 0.39 
Leverage -0.1274 -1.11 
Lock-up period 0.2154*** 6.76 
Pay-out period 0.2118*** 8.87 
RIA 0.1761** 1.89 
Category -0.1743 -1.71 
Initial AUM 0.4161*** 25.5 
 
Hazard Process 
  
Spline0-5 0.5036*** 5.26 
Spline5-8 -0.0129 -0.15 
Spline8+ 0.0294 0.84 
Constant -1.1454* -1.53 
PCA 0.0393 0.58 
Management fee 23.9886* 1.88 
Incentive fee 3.1422** 2.44 
HWM -0.2364 -1.06 
Leverage -0.0934 -0.64 
Lock-up period 0.0025 0.05 
RIA -0.5579*** -3.38 
Category -0.1841 -1.30 
Fund return -0.1461*** -4.86 
Volatility 1.4979* 1.59 
AUM -0.5082*** -4.81 
 
1.7340*** 61.8 
 1.1833*** 3.90 
 -0.4855*** -3.80 
Log Likelihood -5230.5131 
 
Note: TKLV WDEOH UHSRUWV WKH MRLQW FRHIILFLHQW HVWLPDWHV RI D OLQHDU 2/6 PRGHO IRU IXQG PDQDJHUV¶
Personal Capital Amount (PCA) and a log-continuous hazard model for the hedge fund failure of 
Equation (3). The dependent variable for linear OLS regression is the actual amount that fund managers 
invest in the fund they run. The random error terms and  are assumed to follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix . The sample extends from January 
1994 to July 2014. The estimation results are obtained by full information maximum likelihood 
estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.a 
Single process estimation results for hazard models using personal capital ± full sample. 
 
 Full Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Hazard Process 
Spline0-5 0.3248*** 17.5 
Spline5-8 -0.0483** -2.49 
Spline8+ 0.0561*** 6.81 
Constant -0.4543*** -4.23 
PC -0.2234*** -6.21 
Management fee -0.5216 -0.25 
Incentive fee 1.9140*** 8.18 
HWM 0.0519 1.48 
Leverage 0.0248 0.76 
Lock-up period 0.0557*** 3.85 
RIA -0.3257*** -6.23 
Category 0.0082 0.23 
Fund return -1.4415*** -33.7 
Volatility 0.3621*** 12.8 
AUM -0.4138*** -19.9 
 0.6988
*** 9.38 
Log Likelihood -41634.9652 
 
Note: This table reports the single coefficient estimates of a log-continuous hazard model for the hedge 
fund failure of Equation (3). The sample extends from January 1994 to July 2014. The estimation results 
are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.b 
Single process estimation results for hazard models using cumulative incentive fees as 
managerial ownership ± full sample. 
 
 Full Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Hazard Process 
Spline0-5 0.4028*** 25.1 
Spline5-8 -0.1238*** -7.62 
Spline8+ 0.0453*** 7.05 
Constant -0.6065*** -6.12 
Management fee -1.4770 -0.75 
Incentive fee 0.0910 0.43 
HWM 0.1065*** 3.29 
Leverage -0.0825** -2.73 
Lock-up period 0.0721*** 5.54 
RIA -0.3600*** -7.30 
Category -0.0001 -0.00 
Fund return -1.2810*** -43.1 
Volatility 0.0206 0.39 
AUM -0.4127*** -26.7 
Ownership 1.7494*** 50.0 
 0.6070*** 12.6 
Log Likelihood -41155.687 
 
Note: This table reports the single coefficient estimates of a log-continuous hazard model for the hedge 
fund failure of Equation (3) except for PC being replaced by incentive fees reinvestment (Ownership). 
The sample extends from January 1994 to July 2014. The estimation results are obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 6  
Joint estimation results for multi-process Probit-hazard model using personal capital ± absolute 
defunct sample. 
 
 Absolute Defunct Sample 
Variables Coefficients t-value 
Probit Process  
Constant -0.9675*** -4.97 
Management fee -7.2771** -2.03 
Incentive fee 3.5260*** 8.56 
HMW -0.2027*** -3.52 
Leverage 0.6128*** 12.0 
Lock-up period 0.0400* 1.88 
Pay-out period -0.0858*** -5.25 
RIA 0.9045*** 11.2 
Category 0.1974*** 3.80 
Initial AUM -0.0261** -2.50 
 
Hazard Process 
  
Spline0-5 0.3267*** 14.0 
Spline5-8 -0.0758*** -2.89 
Spline8+ 0.0116 1.03 
Constant 0.1894 1.21 
PC 0.0481 0.33 
Management fee 2.5974 0.75 
Incentive fee 2.3556*** 6.57 
HMW -0.1443* -2.74 
Leverage -0.0271 -0.50 
Lock-up period -0.0111 -0.48 
RIA -0.4753*** -5.19 
Category 0.0473 0.81 
Fund return -2.0174*** -21.4 
Volatility 0.0507 0.93 
AUM -0.5368*** -18.5 
 
0.4540*** 3.06 
 0.8348*** 9.41 
 -0.4327** -2.61 
Log Likelihood -22542.7058 
 
Note: TKLVWDEOHUHSRUWVWKHMRLQWFRHIILFLHQWHVWLPDWHVRID3URELWPRGHOIRUWKHIXQGPDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDO
capital of Equation (1) and a log-continuous hazard model for the hedge fund failure of Equation (3) 
using the Absolute Defunct sample which includes only tKH³OLTXLGDWLRQ´FDWHJRU\DV'HIXQFWIXQGV
The dependent variable for Equation (1) takes on the value of one if the fund manager invests personal 
capital and zero otherwise. The sample extends from January 1994 to July 2014. The estimation results 
are obtained by full information maximum likelihood estimation. Figures marked with ***, ** and * 
are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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